The North African Campaign Of World War II
Supplying North Africa
The Panzer IV was the mainstay of the Afrika Corps and were needed in
great numbers in the Western Desert
Supplies
“Sustained British successes against the Axis supply route to North
Africa, successes...were to have considerable importance for the future course
of the fighting on land1
Once all the data concerning the North African Campaign is analysed it
can be clearly seen that it was the field of supplies that was the critical
factor for both the Allies and the Axis powers. It was the Allied success in
the Mediterranean that enabled them to land an enormous amphibious force
in the Torch landings and equip the Eighth Army to defeat the Afrika Korps at
El Alamein in September 1942. Supplies were the single most important factor
that influenced the outcome of the North African Campaign, because they
were
critical to a theatre that was a considerable distance from both of the
main participating nations (Germany and Britain)and had to be delivered
to North Africa via the Mediterranean under the constant threat from
submarine, surface and Air forces.
Both the Afrika Korps and the Eighth Army both totally and constantly
relied upon supplies for essential fuel and equipment ranging from tanks
and guns all the way down to food and uniforms. “The
Mediterranean turned into a major theatre, with a mutual battle for convoy
corridors2 and the success with which Force K operated
from
Malta with the help of Ultra decrypts was
without doubt a decisive factor in the campaign.
The lack of supplies forced Rommel into switching to the offensive at Alam
halfa on 30th
August 1942 when tactically he would have waited longer, and this was made
possible by the sacrifice made by sending supplies to Malta. It is also
important to note that Rommel was able to launch his counter offensive at
Gazala, because he had received a significant
number of tanks from supply
convoys that successfully reached North Africa, because Force K at Malta had
been neutralised by the Luftwaffe and also due to the extensive mining of
the
waters surrounding Malta. The seriousness with which the Axis powers
regarded supplies can be fully appreciated when the Ultra decrypts are analysed
and reveal that Rommel was constantly requesting more supplies and stressing
that he couldn`t operate effectively without them on a frequent basis.
There is also the
fact that both the Axis and Allied powers had many other fronts to supply and
to consider, which meant that supplies were always a very contensious
issue between High Command and the Desert commanders. Therefore the North
African theatre battled for status over Greece, the Eastern front and the
Second front that Stalin so desperately wanted to see.
When the Italians declared war on the British by attacking British Somaililand
and Eritrea then moving their forces into Egypt from Libya, the British force
was far to small and scattered to enable an effective defence and counter
offensive. The Italians had numerous successes and managed to reach the
Egyptian border, but when the British sent reinforcements and Operation
Compass was
launched by Wavell, the battle for North Africa was turned around almost
overnight with the Italians being completely taken by surprise at the speed of
the British build up. Within a two month offensive the British had captured
130,000 Italian soldiers and reached El Agheila
where it was ordered to stop.
It was in this first phase of the Desert War that supplies proved to be crucial
to modern warfare and especially so in the case of the North African Campaign
where the front stretched for hundreds of miles and was also very far away from
the two main participating countries homelands (Britain and later
Germany). In 1941 Allied shipping losses were
very high, but as the Allies became more proficient at suppyling Malta and North
Africa as a whole, these losses halfed in 1942 and both Naval and Air
superiority were regained in the Mediterannean. Torbruk was able to withstand
an eight month siege from April 1941 to December as supplies were delivered via
the port and the Allied offensive in the Mediterannean became more and more
effective throughout 1942 with the Italians losing 50% of their supplies at sea
in December 1942. In 1943 the Axis suffered even more catastrophic losses in
the Mediterannean with 1,200 ships being sunk; and “in february only 25,000
tons had arrived instead of the 80,000 required3: the
effect on the Axis
forces in North Africa certainly being decisive. The Afrika Korps were heavily
handicapped by the fact that supplies did, at certain critical times in
the
campaign, dictate their strategy. Malta was a
critical asset to the Allies and
a grave thorn in the side for the Axis powers throughout the war in North
Africa; it was the Allied success in keeping Malta supplied and therefore
allowing Force K to effectively operate against the Italian Merchant Fleet
that
was the decisive factor in winning the North African war for the Allies. If
Malta had fallen to the Axis powers as had Crete,
then the Luftwaffe and the
U-Boats would have had the perfect base from which to attack British
supply convoys, control the Mediterannean and the ability to supply
the Afrika Corps effectively with much less risk.
During the pendulem war that continued over hundreds of miles between the
Eighth Army and the Afrika Korps there was another critical battle continuing
in the Mediterranean between the Italian Merchant fleet and Allied Submarines
based at Malta aswell as the Surface forces at Gibralta (Force H),
Alexandria (Force B) and Malta (Force K). This was to be a critical battle due
to the distances
involved in the fighting in North Africa, where supply lines grew longer and
longer and fuel became more scarce due to the highly mobile warfare that
was being fought. Both sides suffered from this style of warfare and this
created the pendulem war referred to earlier with one army advancing too fast
for its supplies to keep up, making it vulnerable, whilst the other
shortens his supply lines as he
is beaten back towards his base, which enables the counter offensive and so
it continued. ”The British bombers, torpedo bombers and submarines
based on the island were exacting a merciless toll on the Italian merchant
tonnage in the central Mediterranean4, which inevitably led to a
very real
weakness in Rommels Afrika Korps, with fuel and ammunition being rationed and
the realisation that the Allies would soon have the numerical superiority
pushing Rommel beyond the limits of his
capability.
There is a very clear relation between the events in the Mediterranean and the
desert itself, as when the Axis forces virtually annihalated Force K at Malta,
Rommel received his supplies and more importantly
his armour, and was thus able
to take the Eighth Army by surprise at Gazala in
May 1942. Also in the latter
half of 1941 the Allies enjoyed a period of “sustained Britih successes
against the Axis supply route to North Africa... successes which were to have
considerable importance for the future course of the fighting on land
5
Through Ultra decrypts the Allies “were able to speculate with some
confidence about the state of the enemies which was without doubt
a great advantage as possessing insight into the enemies weaknesses made it
easier to predict his moves and allowed the Allies to exploit these
weaknesses to the full.
It was Ultra which denied all seaborne supplies to Rommel's retreating
army and forced him to withdraw right into Tunisia 7
and this trend throughout the Campaign proves that the Allied ability to supply
its Army, whilst preventing the Axis powers doing likewise, was the decisive
factor in the North African Camapign in the Second World War.
1 F.H Hinsley, British intelligence In the Second World War Volume 2
2 John Keegan, The Times Atlas Of The Second World War (page 78)
3 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin - Parallel Lives (page 880)
4 Peter Young, Purnells Encyclopedias of the Second World War (Volume 2 page 433)
5 F.H Hinsley, British intelligence In the Second World War Volume 2
6 F.H Hinsley, British intelligence In the Second World War Volume 2
7 F.W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret page 100
Diverted and Committed Troops
Weapons In North Africa
Intelligence in North Africa
Commanders and their tactics
High Command Disputes And Interference
Concluding thoughts on the North African Campaign
Back to the Start
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