The North African Campaign Of World War II
On Both Sides of the balance-sheet there were
non-starters to be deducted1
Weapons In North Africa
For a more in depth look at the decisicive weapons of the North African
Campaign go to my German Technological Superiority
page.
The fact that Rommels DAK (Deutsches Afrika Korps) in North
Africa contained equipment which was far more advanced and effective than the
Eighth Armies equivalent meant that the campaign lasted much longer than it may
have done otherwise, whilst at the same time there were not sufficient numbers
of them to become a decisive factor in the campaign. For instance, when the
British launched Operation Crusader in late November 1941 “the 8th Army
outnumbered the combined Axis force (118,000 men to 113,000), had 680 tanks
(with 500 in reserve or in supply) to Rommels 390 and 1000 British planes
confronted 320 Axis aircraft2. What the Times Atlas of the
Second World War and many other history books
does not mention is that these statistics are completely misleading as one
British tank
is not equal to one Panzer whilst “The Eighth
Army`s air support, though numerically superior, was qualitatively
inferior3 and in making this mistake it is not alone.
It was not until the Second battle of El Alamein
that the Allies possessed the sufficient superiority in numbers to offset the
technical superiority that the Axis force enjoyed. This is an important point
that is very rarely mentioned in literature on the Second World War let alone
the North African theatre, where technical superiority was of utmost importance
due to the precarious nature of supplying an
army.
Included in the forces that Hitler sent to North Africa in early 1941 were many
different types of weapons and with more and more experience of fighting the
Afrika Korps it became clear to the Allies that there was a significant
difference between the quality of equipment being used by the two armies. The
Afrika Korps had two distinctly superior weapons at their disposal in North
Africa; the Panzer tanks deployed in the 15th Panzer
Division and the 21st
Panzer Division and their anti-tank guns when pitted against the
British
counter-parts (the 2 pounder and 6 pounder)
proved to be a
very significant factor in battle. Indeed “German tank losses were only
about one-eighth of the British losses4 during Operation
Battleaxe (the
British attempt to relieve Torbruk) and this was the first time that British
weapons such as the Matilda and Grant tanks, aswell as the standard
British two pounder anti tank gun “proved to be
totally inadequate5.
Intelligence was slow in establishing “the extent to which the British
weapons were inferior to the Germans6 as it was not until
enemy weapons were
captured and sent back to Britain for analysis that it became apparent that
“extra armour plates were face hardened - to an extent which made the German
tanks invulnerable to frontal penetration by the British two
pounder7.
The 88mm flak gun was used as an anti-tank gun more
and more frequently as
the conflict progressed and the Allies were slow to grasp its efect upon the
battlefield. At a startling 2000 yards it could still penetrate the British
tanks frontal armour, which made it an extremely lethal weapon in the Germans
armoury and a severe threat to the British tanks throughout the Desert War.
All the technical edges which Rommel’s Afrika Korps had over the Eighth army
helped Rommel to inflict heavy losses on the British, inevitably lengthening
the desert war. This had to weighed up against the fact that the Italians
weapons were as much a liability as were the German ones superior. The Afrika
Korps did not receive sufficient numbers of these superior weapons, such as
the Panther and Tiger tanks or the 88mm flak
guns to enable it to be a decisive
factor in the campaign, but there were enough to lengthen the
Desert war considerably.
British forces in Africa could do little to rectify the enemys continuing
superiority in quality of armour and armament before the end of the battle of
Alam el Halfa in September 19428, but in time for the
Second Battle
of El Alamein the British attained “numerical superiority in guns,
aswell as in tanks 9 which was significant in that it
tipped the balance in the Eighth Armies favour. Numerical superiority
therefore was of the utmost importance, and for this to be achieved, victory
in the Mediterranean and success in the field of supplies was critical, and
indeed decisive.
1 Peter Young, Purnells Encyclopedias Of The Second World War (Volume 3, page
874)
2 John Keegan, The Times Atlas Of The Second World War (page 80)
3 Peter Young, Purnells Encyclopedias Of The second World War (Volume 3, page
874)
4 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 - appendix 14
page 709)
5 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 - appendix 14
page 706)
6 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 -
appendix 14
page 707)
7 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 - appendix 14
page 707)
8 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 - appendix 14
page 715)
9 British Intelligence In The Second World War (Volume 2 - appendix 14
page
715)
Supplies
Diverted and Committed Troops
Intelligence in North Africa
Commanders and their tactics
High Command Disputes And Interference
Concluding thoughts on the North African Campaign
Back to the Start
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